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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes a stages-of-development model according to which, as living standards rise, the 
responsibility for insuring against risks associated with retirement is laid upon Government in the form 
of emerging social security systems. Later, political support for the continued expansion of social 
security systems weakens, and containment becomes the order of the day. Clear signs of such 
containment were evident in the OECD economies during the 1980s. 
However, this model appears not to describe the development of social security in reforming 
(essentially, Latin American) and transition (essentially, Eastern and Central European) economies, 
where social security systems have become sources of distortion and imbalance at levels of 
development much lower than those that prevailed in OECD economies when policy makers first 
expressed concern and began to implement measures to correct those imbalances. A social security 
reform agenda is discussed which would shift more risk to the individual, taking reforming and 
transition economies into relatively unexplored territory. The social costs of economic reform and of 
transition from command to market economy have been greater than many analysts anticipated, and 
how reforms will be implemented in the currently difficult atmosphere remains to be seen, as does the 
long-term viability of reformed social security systems. 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
The Growth and Containment of Social Security Systems: 
A "Stages-of-Development" Model 
Transition and Reform Economies 
Issues 
Recommendations for Reform 
Near-Term Measures 
Long-Term Reform 
Some Examples 
Reforming Economies: Examples of Chile and Uruguay 
Transition Economies: Examples of Russia and Hungary 
A Broader Perspective on Pension Problems 
Conclusion 
References 
SOCIAL SECURITY ISSUES 
IN REFORMING AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES' 
F. Landis MacKellar 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
Laxenburg, Austria 
and 
Willianz P. McGreevey 
World Bank 
Washington, D.C., USA 
THE GROWTH AND CONTAINMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS: 
A "STAGES-OF-DEVELOPMENT" MODEL 
Social security is a device to redistribute risk and reduce its short term costs. Few characteristics of 
a society (or a culture) are more basic, or reflect more closely its values, than the prevailing pattern 
of risk-sharing (Douglas 1990). Risk can be redistributed through the insurance market, but i t  cannot 
be eliminated: in an equilibrium framework, it must be borne somewhere, with attendant consequences 
for efficiency and equity (Diamond 1993). 
Imperfect competition and market failures may justify and warrant state intervention to provide 
compulsory social security benefits for reasons often cited: 
(i) Asymmetric or incomplete information can cause adverse selection: the healthy buy annuities, 
the frail get health policies, and generalized myopia causes many to underinsure for retirement 
needs (Kotlikoff 1987); 
(ii) external benefits or dis-benefits; e.g., costs imposed by the (uninsured) aged poor or the disabled 
on society at large in the form of demand for public services; 
(iii) increasing returns to scale; e .g . ,  the advantages of risk pooling; and 
(iv) the problem of public goods; e .g . ,  if persons experience dis-utility as a result of the existence of 
the destitute elderly, then some households might free-ride on the altruism of other, more soft- 
hearted,  household^.^ 
This paper was written for presentation at the Population Association of America's Annual Meetings held 
in San Francisco, California, 6-8 April 1995. 
This problem can also be construed as an externality in which the welfare of household j is an argument 
in the utility function of household i. Note that we have left moral hazard off the list because this affects public, 
as well as private, insurance markets. Diamond (1993) argues, however, that Government can at least counter 
moral hazard more effectively than the private market. 
The market for old-age insurance is non-clearing (Barr 1992) because the probability of the event 
insured against (retirement) is practically unity and some of the risks associated with the insurance 
contract are perfectly co-variant (e.g., inflation or improvements in life expectancy). Because of the 
combination of the two, there are risks that cannot be laid off and the free market will under-supply 
insurance. Similar arguments apply to the provision of health insurance. 
Since its origins in the compulsory sickness, disability and old-age insurance program instituted in 
Germany by Bismarck in the 1880s, social security has undergone an expansion in OECD countries 
to the point that it is the cornerstone of social welfare policy. Parrott's Fundamental Law of Social 
Security (Parrott 1992) pithily sums up the OECD-country experience: social security spending in any 
country must invariably rise over time. Hudson (1993) cites research indicating that, between 1930 
and 1980 -- the "golden age" of social security -- the proportion of workers covered by old-age 
insurance in eighteen industrial countries grew from 20% to 80% and the average pension expressed 
as a percentage of the average wage from 14% to 55%. Pari passu, the proportion of aged persons 
in the active labor force fell and the concept of "retirement" as a definable phase of the life cycle took 
root. As populations have aged and social security systems have deepened, government provision of 
health care has also grown apace. Public pensions and health care comprise the bulk of spending in 
all social security systems; the residual (comprised mostly of unemployment benefits, workman's 
compensation and family allowances) is secondary. 
International experience is summarized in Tables 1 and 2, which present data for 43 countries in 1972 
(the earliest year for which data are available), 1980 and 1991; the data are plotted in Figures 1-6. The 
criterion for inclusion in the sample was simply availability of data for all three years. This eliminates 
the formerly socialist countries, whose quite distinct development we discuss below. In some countries, 
such as the U.S., the data underestimate the true extent of social security spending because only central 
government expenditure is included. We also ignore bias arising from relative price effects; i.e., the 
possibility that the deflator appropriate for social security expenditure is different than the overall GDP 
price deflator. 
Figures 1 through 3 plot cross-sectional data on social security spending as a percentage of GNP 
against real GDP per capita (1985 Summers-Heston international purchasing-power-parity  dollar^).^ 
The income elasticity of the expenditure share (change in social security expenditure share per 
percentage point change in GDP per capita) appears to rise with income -- that is, as countries reach 
higher levels of development, economic growth appears to elicit progressively greater expansion of 
social security spending. However, this increase may instead be due to population aging. Expressing 
the social security share and share of the population aged over 65 as percentages (i.e., 0 < SocSecSh 
< 100 and ditto for SH65+), least-squares lines for 1972, 1980 and 1991 are 
SocSecSh = -36.89 + 9.12 In Y - 0.60 (In Y)2 + 1.22 SH65+ 
(1.19) (1.20) (6.10) 
R2 = 0.77 
SocSecSh = -34.95 + 7.97 In Y - 0.47 (In Y ) ~  + 0.96 SH65+ 
(1.14) (1.04) (7.38) 
R2 = 0.85 
SocSecSh = -22.35 + 4.96 In Y - 0.29 (In Y ) ~  + 0.87 SH65+ 
(0.53) (0.49) (4.35) 
R2 = 0.69 
GDP data for 1991 in Tables 5 and 6 are actually for 1990 (or most recent estimate). 
Table 1 .  Social security expenditure (% of GNP; central government only). Source: 1992 and 1993 
World Development Reports, Table 11. Some figures are for years other than those specified. 
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Table 2. Social security balance (revenue minus expenditure) (% of GNP; central government only). 
Source: 1992 and 1993 World Developr~~ent Repor-ts, Table I I .  Some figures are for years other than 
those specified. 
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where Y is per capita GDP, N=43 in each case, and t-statistics are given in parentheses. What emerges 
most strongly is a roughly unitary elasticity of social security spending with respect to the share of the 
population aged over 65. In view of the role of outliers, heteroscedasticity, the multicollinearity of age 
structure and per capita income, the simultaneous-equations bias which results from failure to 
disentangle demand for social security spending from the supply of funds, etc., coefficients on both 
income and age may be biased. If these parameters are to be believed, however, by the time a country 
reaches the level of development of one of the lower-income OECD countries, like Greece or Portugal 
(per capita GDP = $5,000; i.e., In Y on the order of 8), the income elasticity of the expenditure share 
is already negative: expenditure per capita may coi~tinue to rise, but more slowly than per capita GDP. 
A heuristic, stages-of-development explanation of the growth of social security spending might run as 
follows. A requirement for the development of formal social insurance systems is widespread 
acceptance of the illusion that workers' contributions, usually wage-based taxes, are proportional to 
eventual benefits. When a country is poor, the state's ability to engage in social security expenditure 
is constrained by its limited ability to levy payroll and income taxes. When a country passes through 
the middle stages of development, the supply constraint is loosened as the fiscal mix shifts towards the 
direct taxes that lend themselves to the financing of social ins~rance .~  Simultaneously, demand for 
social security spending increases for a number of reasons. Household demand for leisure in the form 
of years of retirement rises with income, as does demand for insurance against disability or s i c k n e s ~ . ~  
When the old-age dependency ratio rises as a result of the epidemiological and demographic transition, 
these demands are made effective at the aggregate level. Individuation and the decline of the extended 
family weaken traditional household-based care-giving mechanisms6 and increased migration and 
urbanization weaken community-based systems. The result, on both the supply- and demand sides, is 
an increase in social security spending. 
While social security spending expands rapidly on average, it is evident from the wide scatter of points 
on the right-hand side of Figures 1 through 3 that policy makers, and the societies they represent, have 
considerable room to choose the desired level of state inter~ention.~ Down an accommodative path 
lies a Northern European centralized social welfare state; down the restrictive path lies a system closer 
to that prevailing in the United States, in which programs are decentralized and there is Inore stringent 
means-testing of benefits. Which path is preferable is, of course, a complex question, and different 
countries have and will continue to make widely differing choices. The strictly fiscal tradeoffs may 
be fairly easy to generalize across countries, but the income-leisure tradeoff (the costs of high payroll 
taxes versus the benefits of early retirement), the desired distribution of income (both cross-sectionally 
and inter-generationally), attitudes towards risk and the value attached to intra-family transfers are 
anything but internationally comparable.8 
Lindauer and Velenchik (1992) refer to supply-side explanations of developing-country government 
expenditure as the "Please effect," followiilg Please (1967). 
"lark and Anker (1992) present cross-sectional evidence that the labor force participation rate of older 
workers drops sharply with level of per capita GDP, even after controlling for the greater availability of social 
security pensions at higher income levels. 
As does, of course, the growth of the social security system itself. Cox and Jimenez (1992) estimate that 
the Peruvian social security system "crowds out" 20% of hypothetical transfers from children to parents. 
For a cross-cultural survey of social security systems, see Dixon and Scheurell (1993). 
A theme which we do not pursue in this paper, apart from this footnote, is that social security regimes can 
be framed in terms of three differing cultural views: hierarchist, individualist and egalitarian (Thompson et al. 
1990). Each view can be grounded in a set of values and beliefs which privileges or "dignifies" a particular 
It would seem obvious, despite the impression left by Figures 1 through 3, that the growth of social 
security spending must eventually cease. Judging from Figures 4 through 6, which plot social security 
balances against GDP per capita, the rapid expansion of social security expenditure as a country enters 
the middle stages of development is not matched by an equally rapid expansion of social security 
revenues. To continue the stages-of-development explanation, a public-choice argument would have 
it that, with the rise of the less-favored class' claim on fiscal resources, its members' incentive to lobby 
for further re-distribution is weakened; symmetrically, as the fiscal drain on the well-to-do increases, 
they have more incentive to resist expansion of social spending9 Increases in taxation become 
onerous because of the deadweight opportunity costs to which they give rise.'' On both counts, 
social security systems eventually come under pressure and containment, rather than expansion, 
becomes the order of the day. With improving health, the necessity of insuring against merely 
surviving into old age is diminished (Hudson 1993); what becomes relevant is the more limited 
problem of insuring against the "terminal drop" which precedes death (Wilson 1991). 
A recent shift from expansion to containment is clearly illustrated when the data i n  Figures 1 through 
3 are plotted in first-difference form to capture the experience of individual countries. Figures 7 and 
8 plot change in social security expenditure per capita (dollars per year) against change in GDP per 
capita in 1972-80 and 1980-9 I ; the 45-degree line is also drawn. In 1972-80, no country in the sample 
experienced negative change in either GDP per capita or social security spending per capita and, in 
half-a-dozen industrial countries, the change in social security expenditure actually exceeded the 
increment to GDP. In 1980-91, by contrast, a number of countries experienced negative income 
growth and virtually all of these either held social security spending constant or reduced it somewhat. 
Of the majority of countries which experienced increases in income per capita, a number either reduced 
social security spending per capita or held it nearly constant. 11 
social setting (i.e.,  a certain ordering of social rclations according to which the transactions of life arc conducted); 
each is bascd on a differcnt view of hu~iian nature and each gives rise to a characteristic welfare criterion. The 
individualist position would prefer a 1uis.scz-faire approach to retirement savings, combined with a Rawlsian 
minimum high enough to prevent destitution but low enough to cause discomfort. The hierarchist position would 
call for forced saving through a centralized pension plan, with benefits being tied to earnings; the egalitarian 
position would also call for forced saving through a centralized pension plan, but would use benefits to effect 
a massive re-distribution. The hierarchist position would prefer a fully-funded approach because of the financial 
discipline which it imposes; the egalitarian position would prefer a Pay-as-You-Go approach because of the 
practically unlimited opportunities for re-distribution which it offers. To be viable, any social security system 
must be supported by a tolerably strong coalition of persons subscribing to the three positions. 
Lindert (1993) hypothesizes that the rise of social spending is constrained by the fact that, with improving 
living standards, the median voter comcs to identify histher interests with those of the well-to-do rather than the 
poor. This might be called "There but for the grace of God ..." in reverse. 
'The thesis of classical theory, which goes back to Smith, is that as income is increasingly re-distributed 
from those who produce to those who do not, the former will lose the motivation to work; this was, of course, 
the major tenet of the Reagan-Thatcher view of social welfare spending. A supporting tenet, which currently 
enjoys some vogue in the American capital, is that the public provision of welfare leads to the crowding out of 
private virtue. Evidence regarding the so-called "moral atrophy" hypothesis, drawn mostly from experimental 
psychology, is mixed (Goodin 1993). 
" For a general discussion of the sea-change in OECD fiscal policy during the 1980s, see Oxley and Martin 
(1991). 
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Figure 7. Social security expenditure and GDP, 1972-80 (1985 USD). 
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Figure 8. Social security expenditure and GDP, 1980-91 (1985 USD). 
The shift can be statistically illustrated as follows. According to an obvious decomposition model, 
average annual absolute change in per capita social security expenditure (dSocSec/Pop) in 1972-80 and 
1980-9 1 was: 
where other variables are as previously defined, d is the difference operator, N=43 again and t-statistics 
are in parentheses. Applying parameter estimates to sample averages, we may decompose the sample 
average annual change in social security expenditure in the two time periods as follows: 
In the 1970s, increases in per capita social security expenditure were observed in countries which 
experienced either an increase in the share of the population aged over 65 or growth in real income 
per capita. In the 1980s, expenditure per capita grew only in countries which both (i) experienced 
economic growth and (ii) were characterized by an already-old age distribution. If terms are combined, 
the result is as follows: 
Source of growth 1972-80 1980-9 1 
autonomous (constant term) 13.952 1.751 
due to income, holding age distribution constant 14.282 7.988 
due to age distribution, holding income constant 26.336 - 1.092 
Total 54.570 8.647 
In the 1970s demand for social security was accommodated, economic expansion or no; in the 1980s, 
social security expenditure had to compete on more even footing with alternative uses of resources. 
There may thus be mechanisms of self-correction that work against excessive reliance on social 
security. 
This suggestion is far more optimistic about the future than the scenario implicit in an international 
cross section linking public pension and health spending to population aging (See Figure 9). These 
data led the World Bank authors to write in bold-face type, "Spending on health and pensions 
increases exponentially as the population ages" (World Bank 1994, p. 44). For the low- and middle- 
income economies with which the World Bank works, analysts must certainly hope there are 
adjustment mechanisms that would prevent runaway health and pension spending. Putting those 
mechanisms in place may be one of the key challenges to effective management of the next phase of 
economic development. 
Figure 9. Public pension spending and population age structure. Source: World Bank 1994, Figure 
1.10. 
For many of the command economies in transition from socialism, a grave problem is that benefit 
promises are already in place for most of the population, yet resources, which were never abundant, 
are even scarcer now because the shift to a market economy has been costly in terms of declining 
output. These cases require separate discussion and treatment. 
TRANSITION AND REFORM ECONOMIES 
The stages-of-development model sketched above is heuristically useful, but it fails to explain why 
social security systems in a number of countries appear to be breaking down well before they reach 
maturity. Social security systems in many of the reforming (essentially, Latin American) and virtually 
all of the transition (essentially, Eastern and Central European) economies have become major sources 
of micro-economic distortion and macro-economic imbalance. As a result, policy makers are being 
urged, and are increasingly choosing, to follow a reform path which places greater responsibility for 
risk on individuals' shoulders. 
The development of social security in the transition economies took its lead from the Former Soviet 
Union, where a social security system based on state-owned enterprises emerged during the thirties; 
this model was adopted by all countries of the socialist bloc, including China, and grew rapidly during 
the heyday of central planning in the 1950s and 1960s. Since open unemployment was unknown, 
coverage was universal; wages were low, but workers were compensated by eligibility for benefits 
provided by the state through the enterprise (in the USSR; this was less in evidence elsewhere in the 
Eastern Bloc); access to benefits was, of course, a key instrument of coercion. As a result, all the 
countries of the socialist bloc have inherited social security systems which are far more comprehensive 
than would be predicted on the basis of their per capita income alone. Early retirement,12 widespread 
eligibility for extended sick-leave and disability pensions (none of which necessarily involved actually 
leaving the work force, or even the enterprise) and a high replacement ratio were implicitly part of the 
social contract.13 "Tax policy" consisted of claiming the surpluses of those state-owned enterprises 
that operated at a profit (Jenkins 1992); "anti-poverty policy" consisted of humanitarian assistance to 
those at the margin of society (Milanovic 1994). 
Development of social security in Latin America was driven in large part by rent-seeking.14 
Politically influential groups and the "labor aristocracy" were able to lay claim to fiscal resources 
through the expansion of social security systems.15 Whether the prime mover was the militancy of 
special interest groups or the state's eagerness to gamer support appears to have varied from country 
to country (Mesa-Lago 1978). Social security deficits in the region have been financed out of general 
revenue, which is regressive since all persons pay taxes and yet only formal-sector workers are eligible 
for benefits. Alternatively, payroll taxes have been passed along to consumers in the form of cost-plus 
pricing (Mesa-Lago 1991); this is regressive since, when social security systems are in their early 
stages, the average consumer is poorer than the average social security beneficiary. 
Issues 
Table 3 summarizes the situation in selected reforming and transition countries where social security 
issues have figured prominently in policy dialogue with the World Bank. The following issues emerge 
repeatedly, although obviously not in every country: 
l 2  Eligibility for early retirement was typically based on membership of a hazardous or stressful occupation. 
In some countries, such as Romania, the list of occupations eligible for early retirement steadily grew; eventually 
to the point of including, for example, office workers, as a form of disguised (and highly regressive) wage 
increases. In the case of occupations which actually ure hazardous, the early retirement benefit poses a severe 
problem of moral hazard, since it discourages both employers and employees from addressing the conditions 
which give rise to the hazard. 
l 3  To get an idea of how important "double dipping" was, a formal-sector enterprise survey taken in 1990 
revealed that pensioners accounted for 5.7% and 2.6% of employment in Hungary and Bulgaria, respectively 
(Sziraczki and Windell 1992). Milanovic (personal communication) estimates that double-dipping in the former 
Soviet Union amounted to 20-25% of all pensioners; i.e., about 8-10% of the employed. As Fox (1993) points 
out, early retirement was also encouraged by the high return to unpaid work, such as queuing, gardening, home- 
repairs, etc., under central planning. 
l 4  Rent-seeking was hardly a negligible factor in the case of the OECD countries, as well. It is easy to 
forget that the European Welfare State was erected despite the indifference of the Left, not at its instigation 
(Ashford 1993). 
I s  In addition to benefitting elites directly, the development of social security systems conferred indirect 
benefits. The availability of social security revenues loosens the fiscal constraint on spending in other sectors, 
as well. In addition to benefiting the best-off workers, social security taxation leads to the adoption of more 
capital-intensive production methods, thus benefiting capitalists and the skilled workers whose services are 
complementary to capital. According to dual labor market theory, the tax on formal-sector labor increases the 
number of workers in the informal sector, worsening the distribution of income both between the formal and 
informal sectors on average and within the informal sector itself. Probably the most regressive aspect of social 
security systems in Latin America is that they give beneficiaries access to modern medical services while non- 
beneficiaries lack even basic preventive health care (McCreevey 1990). The health aspect of social security calls 
for a paper in itself. 
Table 3. Social security problems identified in policy dialogue. 
COUNTRY PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED 
Financial Moral Excessive Inequitable lnadequate Inadequate Inefficient 
unsoundness; hazard; payroll benefits; protection rate of administration; 
fiscal early tax limited against return widespread 
burden retirement coverage poverty evasion 
Latin America 
~rgent ina' 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
~olombia' 
Ecuador 
Uruguay 
Europe and Central Asia 
Bulgaria X 
Hungary X 
Kyrgyz Republic X 
Romania X 
Russia 
Slovakia X 
Turkey X 
Ukraine X 
Sources (all World Bank Reports) : 
Argentina: 
Bolivia : 
Brazil: 
Colombia 
Ecuador : 
Hungary : 
Philippines: 
Romania : 
Russia : 
Slovakia : 
Tunisia : 
Ukraine : 
Pcblic Finance Review: From Insolvency to Growth. Report No. 10827-AR (February, 1993). 
Public Sector Expenditure Review with a S~ecial Emphasis on Social Sectors. Report No. 
- 
7746-BO (September 1989) 
Social Insurance and Private Pensions. Report No. 12336-BR (December, 1993). 
Poverty Assessment Report. Report No. 126730-CO. (June 1994). 
Public Sector Finances: Reforms for Growth in the Era of Declininq Oil Output. Report No 
8918-EC (January 1991). 
Hunqary: Reform of Social Policy and Expenditures. Washington, D.C.: World Bank (1992). 
Capital Market Study. Report No. 10053-PH (February, 1992). 
Romania: human resources and the transition to a market economy. Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank (1992). 
Social Protection Durinq Transition and Beyond. Report No. 11748-RU (February 1994). 
Restructurinq for Recovery. Report No. 12282-SK (July 1994). 
The Social Protection System. Report No. 11376-TUN (April, 1993). 
Ukraine: The Social Sectors durinq Transition. Washington, D.C.: World Bank (1993) 
(i) Financial unsoundness and its jiscal inlplicutions. Declining economic output has precipitated 
the crisis in many social security systems; some were never on firm actuarial footing. 
Financially-unsound pension schemes drain government fiscal resources, as in Hungary, and 
comprise a threat to fiscal balance if benefits are restored to a reasonable level in real terms, as 
in Russia. Some governments avoid the fiscal implications of unsound social security systems 
by the simple expedient of reneging on obligations to the beneficiaries. In Argentina and Brazil 
for example, courts of justice spend many hours on pension-related complaints. 
(ii) Micro-economic distortions uild loss of intei.ilationa1 competitiveness. Taxes are often levied 
almost entirely against the employer, resulting in a lack of transparency as the linkage between 
benefits and contributions is no longer perceived by the worker. 
(iii) Inequitable and regressive incidence of taxes clnd benejits. In the transition economies, pension 
payments are usually exempt from income tax, thus further distorting the labor-leisure choice. 
(iv) Moral hazard and its inzplicutiotzs for labor supply. A substantial proportion of the population 
over 55 draw pensions.16 In Brazil, for example, there is no age test for pensions, and 
retirement at 45, after 20 years of contribution, is not uncommon. The distortion of the labor- 
leisure choice is exacerbated in Romania and Bulgaria, where policy makers allow plant 
managers to reduce payrolls by pensioning off older workers instead of shedding labor outright 
(Fox 1993). In fairness to policy makers, on the other hand, economic crisis has given rise to 
a difficult choice between pensioning off older workers so as to hire new graduates, or keeping 
productive older workers in their jobs while younger workers experience long-term 
unemployment. 
(v) Erosion of the real value of peizsions by inflation. This problem, referred to euphemistically in 
the former Soviet Union as "the ruble overhang," has been exacerbated by price liberalization 
and the removal of subsidies. Pensions in Armenia and Georgia are worth less than half of one 
US dollar a month. 
(vi) Inadequate rate of retrlrn on the financial resources udn~inistered by social security institutes. 
When reserves have accumulated, either in partially-funded systems, such as that of the 
Philippines, or in immature pay-as-you-go systems, such as that of Tunisia, these have typically 
served as captive markets for Government treasury securities, low-yielding bond issues earmarked 
for favored projects, subsidized mortgage loans, and the like. Rates of return have as often as 
not been negative; in some cases, spectacularly so (World Bank 1994, pp. 794-95). 
(vii) Administrative inefficiency. By all measures; e.g., ratio of administrative costs to benefits paid 
out, social security institutes in developing and transition economies rank poorly in comparison 
with those in the OECD. 
Workers' perception of unfairness and inequity, the frustration experienced as a result of administrative 
errors and inefficiencies, the inadequate return on contributions and the fact that pensions often fail 
even to protect against poverty combine to result in widespread evasion, fraud and non-compliance, 
especially by the self-employed ( ~ l m  et al. 1991). Most countries lack even the basic tool of fiscal 
enforcement: a taxpayer identification number system. 
l 6  Economic transition i n  Central and Eastern Europe has been accompanied by less open unemployment than 
was widely feared; the problem is that economically inefficient declines in  labor force participation rates have 
substituted for open unemployment (Boeri 1994). 
Recommendations for Reform 
There is some reason to believe that social security problems in the OECD economies are being 
addressed, in the broader context of overall macroeconomic adjustment, along the lines suggested by 
the stages-of-development model elaborated above. By contrast, absent direct policy action, there exist 
no grounds for such optimism in the reform and transition economies; perhaps in part because the costs 
of structural adjustment and transition from a command to a market economy have been greater than 
many analysts expected. In this section, we discuss directions for social security reform in these 
countries. 
The technical issues involved in social security reform are complex, and powerful incumbents and 
vested interests threaten any effective reform. Therefore, policy in the area has been characterized by 
a tendency to adopt short-term solutions with deleterious long-term consequences. To avoid this trap, 
it is important to distinguish between near-term measures, designed to restore systems to financial 
viability while protecting vulnerable groups and addressing the most obvious inefficiencies and 
inequities; and long-term measures, designed to put in place a sustainable social insurance system. In 
the paragraphs which follow, we focus on the pension aspect of social security systems, keeping in 
mind that reform must address other issues as we11.17 
Near-Term Measures 
The options for rescuing a foundering social security system are explicit in the long-run equilibrium 
condition for a pay-as-you-go pension scheme: the payroll tax t required to maintain actuarial balance 
is given by 
t = (pension income / average wage) x (recipients / contributors) 
where the first term in parentheses is referred to as the replacement ratio and the second term as the 
dependency ratio. Raising the payroll tax rate is almost everywhere counter-productive. Reducing fraud 
and non-compliance is difficult to accomplish short of full-scale reform. Cutting benefits to shore up 
a financially distressed pension system is often the only feasible solution. Jenkins (1992) summarized 
the problems succinctly: the retirement age is too low, disability pensions are too easy to obtain, 
benefits are linked to inflated recent earnings rather than true lifetime earnings, and penalties are not 
high enough for those who continue to work while receiving a pension. Thus, the steps necessary to 
stop the hemorrhage of financial resources from the pension system are: 
(i) Reducing the dependency ratio by raising the minimum retirement age, enforcing retirement tests 
for pension eligibility, eliminating problems of moral hazard that reward early retirement, 
implementing policies that reward older workers who choose to defer retirement, tightening 
eligibility for disability pensions, etc.; and 
(ii) Reducing the replacement ratio by modifying the formula used to calculate benefits, lengthening 
the minimum contributory period, applying income tests to reduce payments to pensioners who 
choose to remain in the labor force, etc. 
l 7  We also ignore the obvious fact that the proposed reforms will generate a massive volume of savings, with 
attendant possibilities for the deepening of capital markets. It seems prudent to weigh the pros and cons of 
reformed social security systems on the merit of their social insurance aspects, not their attractiveness as a source 
of investment capital. 
While both measures are important, as a matter of accounting, the greatest savings in most countries 
are available from (i). 
Both steps are painful for older workers, who must be protected during the reform period. A failed 
social security system is a social investment gone bad that must be liquidated at a grave loss. 
Governments must be decisive: aiding but not coddling pensioners; holding the line against 
unreasonable demands. To take these difficult measures tolerably well, governments can separate the 
safety-net purpose of social security from its retirement-insurance purpose. Pensioners should be 
protected against poverty by mobilizing social assistance funds, not by raising pension-benefit levels. 
Retirement and destitution are different risks from an actuarial point of view; moreover, separating the 
safety-net component eliminates the risk that pension benefit rates over the entire income range will 
rise along with the price-indexed minimum pension.'8 
Long-Term Reform 
The steps above relieve financial pressures in the near term; they cannot alone constitute an effective 
and sustainable pension system, which might require these elementslg: 
(i) A compulsory pension scheme administered by de-centralized, private, regulated investment firms 
who compete for workers' savings; 
(ii) A minimal, means-tested, or universal flat pension funded from general revenue to assure against 
elderly poverty; 
(iii) Private, tax-favored pension plans to encourage saving for retirement and disability. 
Countries will differ in their emphases on these elements. Moreover, if social security reform is to 
serve an anti-poverty goal, then in many countries it will need to include reform in the provision of 
health care (McGreevey 1993). 
A necessary condition for reform is that the administration of social security systems be improved to 
increase compliance (Reid and Mitchell 1995). During a transition period, older workers will be 
offered the opportunity to continue to participate in the old pension scheme during the few years they 
have left until retirement; middle-aged workers will be offered inducements to switch as rapidly as 
possible from the old to the new system; and younger workers will start off, as it were, with a clean 
slate. Of course, reform which is overly softened and prolonged can degenerate into no reform at 
l 8  See Barr (1993) for a discussion which stresses the distinction between the efficiency role of social 
security, which facilitates individuals' re-distribution of net consumption over the life cycle, and its equity 
function, which re-distributes income from rich to poor in the current period. A related point is that the labor 
market should be used to allocate resources, while the social insurance system would be employed to re-distribute 
income. Under central planning, widespread disguised unemployment ("labor hoarding") confused the two roles 
(Boeri and Keese 1992). 
l 9  The three-pillar scheme is discussed in detail in World Bank (1994). For another view of pension reform, 
see Iyer (1993). 
20 For example, "The real problem facing Hungary," writes Newberry (1993, p. 269) in concluding his fiscal 
survey of that country, "is that the high proportion of voters who are retired or who receive housing subsidies 
makes desirable expenditure cuts politically difficult." Micklewright and Nagy (1994) find that the Hungarian 
unemployment benefit system is dominated by "special cases" and "grandfathering" clauses which make current 
Experience suggests that low-and-middle-countries should not follow in the steps of the OECD 
countries, who combined the first two pillars of their fledgling social security systems into one, 
partially-funded public pillar. Governments in developing and transition economies are unlikely to 
exercise the fiscal discipline required to maintain system soundness. Pension systems in the OECD 
itself, if not in crisis, are at least suffering from chronic financial malaise; indeed the problems facing 
OECD pension systems are fundamentally similar to those described above (OECD 1988a, 1988b, 
1988c; Heller et al. 1986; Hagemann and Nicoletti 1989). It remains to be seen whether the transition 
to more efficient social security systems in the reforming and transition economies can be managed 
under the difficult prevailing economic conditions, or whether the resulting systems can gamer 
sufficient political support to remain viable.21 
Some Examples 
Reforming Economies: Examples of Chile and Uruguay 
Because of the depth of the crisis of the 1980s, Latin America has led the way in pension system 
reform (Mesa-Lago 1994). The Chilean reform of the early 1980s has been much studied and its 
merits debated (e.g., Santamaria 1992; Gillian and Bonilla 1992), because it involved the most radical 
approach: the dismantling of an unsound pay-as-you-go pension system and its replacement by a 
decentralized, privately managed fully-funded system. Without going into the points of debate -- 
whether the reform passes a range of equity tests, whether it has increased national saving and 
investment, etc. -- two salient points emerge from the Chilean reform. The first is that reform is costly: 
Government is obliged to fund the deficit of the old pension scheme while it is dismantled, to pay off 
the "recognition bonds" which were issued to induce older workers to enroll in the reformed pension 
scheme; in addition, Government is responsible for meeting the minimum pension guarantee for retirees 
with insufficient retirement savings and managing the public service and military pension plans. 22 
The financial information which would make available a comprehensive study of the reformed Chilean 
administrative rules a poor guide to the actual prevailing level and structure of benefits. 
2'  For a perspective from political science on the political economy of reform, see Haggard and Webb 
(1993), who tend to downplay traditional "interest group" analysis and stress institutional factors and the crucial 
role of the timing of crisis and reform. 
22 Consider the simplest case of a "Big Bang" instantaneous transition from a Pay-as-You-Go, defined- 
benefit scheme to a fully-funded defined-contribution scheme. Arrau (1990) has identified Governments' three 
fiscal responsibilities. First, Government must validate the contributions of retirees to the defunct scheme by 
issuing bonds which are deposited into accounts in the new pension system. This amounts to a one-off fiscal 
outflow. Because all contributions following the Big Bang are earmarked, coupon (i.e., pension) payments cannot 
be paid out of workers' payroll contributions; rather, they must be met out of general revenue, which amounts 
to a second, and continuing, fiscal outflow until the last pensioner who was enrolled in the old system dies off. 
The two expenditures, one up front and the other spread over a substantial period of time, can be financed either 
by issuing debt or by raising taxes; in the case of the former, interest payments will comprise a one-third fiscal 
outflow arising from the change. Arrau goes on to establish the sensible proposition that any one-off capital 
accumulation arising from the transition -- not from efficiency gains under the new system, but from the transition 
itself -- must come at the expense of older workers. This is most easily appreciated by noting that the maximum 
capital accumulation would be the windfall which would be reaped if Government simply reneged on obligations 
incurred under the old system. The mere fact that reform will involve inter-generational re-distribution should 
not be allowed to stand in its way, as the existing pension system is also re-distributive. Keyfitz (1985) and 
Lapkoff (1991) have shown that a Pay-As-You-Go pension scheme can never achieve inter-generational equity, 
defined as the same rate of return for different generations, in a non-stable population. Large cohorts experience 
high rates of return; small cohorts experience low rates of return. 
pension system is not available, but Mesa-Lago cites research indicating that the deficit of the social 
security system as a whole is on the order of 5% of GDP. To this should be added the sales and 
marketing costs of the private funds, which are substantial and act as a deadweight tax on workers' 
contributions. Second, and most discouragingly, all observers agree that the sweeping pension reform 
initiated in the late seventies was possible only because the military dictatorship crushed the interest 
groups -- trade unions, civil servants, etc. -- which had previously blocked real reform for decades.23 
If Chile's experience demonstrates the costs of thorough reform, Uruguay represents the dangers of 
half-hearted reform.24 Pension expenditure expanded inexorably as upper-income retirees claimed 
increasingly attractive pension benefits and equity problems were addressed by extension of coverage 
to progressively lower-income households. By the 1970s, the combination of universal coverage, high 
average benefits, population aging and a deteriorating economic situation brought the system to the 
brink of bankruptcy, resulting in the social security reform act of 1979. Despite a number of 
commendable features, especially consolidating the main pension funds under one institution and 
raising the retirement age to 60 for men and 55 for women, the reform incorporated two fatal mistakes: 
first, contribution rates were reduced and the system was allowed to draw on general revenue, which 
loosened fiscal discipline and reduced transparency; second, overly-generous transition provisions 
resulted, in 1980-81, in a wave of retirements under the favorable terms of the old pension system. 
While the near-term solvency of the system was restored, trends during the 1980s made it clear that 
the social security system was structurally unsound. Further reform measures were introduced in 1987, 
but Parliament rejected the most important of these: raising the retirement age to 65 for males and 55 
for females. In 1992, Government again introduced a reform package aimed to force the national 
health system into self-sufficiency, to introduce personal retirement accounts to be administered by the 
social security administration and measures to encourage workers to defer retirement, but the package 
was rejected by Parliament. 
Transition Economies: Examples of Russia and Hungary 
In Russia, the economic situation is so desperate that effective social security reform is impossible. 
The independent Pension Fund (PF) is responsible for management of financial resources; the Ministry 
of Social Protection (MSP) is responsible for calculation and payment of benefits. There are two major 
types of pensions administered by the Pension Fund: labor pensions, paid on the basis of a contribution 
record and received by about three-quarters of all pensioners, and social pensions, which are received 
by those with less than the required five years of contribution. 
The system fails to provide adequate protection to households depending on pensions as sole source 
of income, and has vacillated between pressures to increase pensions in line with inflation and the need 
for fiscal austerity. The result has been a number of confusing ad hoc measures since 1990, with the 
end result has been that the minimum pension remains less than half the estimated poverty-line 
subsistence income (Samorodov 1992). When pensions are adjusted upward, it is by an across-the- 
board percentage rather than by a uniform absolute amount estimated to preserve the real value of the 
minimum pension. Legislation requires that individuals leave their current employment in order to be 
eligible for a pension, but it is not enforced. 
23 Mesa-Lago (1986) argues that the first wave of social security reforms in Latin America -- the reforms 
which are now being reformed -- also occurred during a period (the sixties and seventies) when the power of 
pressure groups vis a vis the state was temporarily weak. 
24 See also Puffert and Jimenez (1989) for a discussion of how effective reform in  Brazil has been 
successfully blocked by pressure groups. 
The Pension Fund's operations are financed by a 21 to 32 percent payroll tax levied against the 
employer and a nominal one percent tax paid by the worker. The PF dates only from 1990 and is in 
surplus; however, this covers a wide regional imbalance, as all pension benefit payments and 
contribution collections are decentralized to the oblast level; some oblasts are in surplus and others in 
deficit. Pension surplus regions are concerned by the accumulation of a surplus at the central level and 
the fact that they effectively subsidize regions with older population age structures and provide added 
social assistance at the local level; therefore, there are pressures to decentralize the pension system. 
Years of employment following retirement are included in calculating pension benefits; as the base 
salary used in calculating pension benefits changes with inflation, frequent and arduous manual re- 
calculation of pension benefits is required of staff working in regional offices. Periodic shortages of 
liquidity and delays associated with the re-calculation of benefits have caused delays in payment. 
Pension system problems in the other Slavic states of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, are perhaps even 
greater than in Russia. 
In Hungary, there have been movements towards reform, but they are still tentative. Hungary inherited 
a pre-transition universal compulsory social insurance system covering old-age, disability and survivors' 
pensions, sick pay and maternity and child care allowances, health care and pharmaceuticals, and 
unemployment compensation; increasing social transfers further are consumer subsidies and housing 
allowances. The Hungarian Social Insurance Fund (SIF) experienced a sharp financial deterioration 
in the early 1990s due to the explosion of unemployment claims and the use of early retirement and 
disability leave as an alternative to unemployment. The latter have risen to as high as 40% of all 
newly granted pensions. Pension expenditure is on the order of 10% of GDP, well above levels 
experienced in OECD countries at much higher levels of income. The pensions system still fails to 
provide an adequate income for pensioners, thus encouraging workers to remain in the labor force after 
retirement. Since the minimum age at retirement and the standard age at retirement are one and the 
same, workers have no incentive to remain in the labor force after they reach the minimum age. The 
53% payroll tax, which falls almost entirely on the employer, is a major source of distortion in the 
economy. 
Since 1990, a number of corrective measures have been introduced or are under consideration. Among 
these are raising from 10 to 20 years the minimum contributory period (implemented 1991), steepening 
the degressivity of the benefit calculation formula (i .e. ,  accelerating the rate at which the percentage 
of income used to calculate pension earnings declines as income rises), postponing indexation of new 
benefits (under consideration) and shifting non-contribution-based benefits out of S F  to the central 
government budget (under consideration). These measures are insufficient, however, to correct the 
structural instability that will result if current trends, particularly high rates of early retirement, are 
extrapolated. Additional steps which are required include, most crucially, raising the effective age at 
retirement, reforming the benefit calculation formula to encourage workers to defer retirement, and 
instituting an income test to substantially reduce pension payments to retirees who continue to engage 
in active employment, including pension benefits in the tax base and deducting pension contributions 
from taxable income. 
A BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON PENSION PROBLEMS 
Amid the pessimism about financial prospects for social security systems, one needs to recall that few 
of the world's people have walked very far down the primrose path. Ask, for example, How deeply 
entrenched in the world's societies and economies are failure-prone social security systems? By 
failure we mean the inability of social security systems to raise wage-based taxes, or alternative sources 
of revenues, high enough to pay for already-committed benefits to participants. All the OECD 
countries have failure-prone systems, although we showed above that they were already moving in the 
1980s toward adjustment of their obligations to their abilities to pay. Because of the political pressures 
of incumbents and vested interests, reform is exceedingly difficult prior to outright failure. 
However, these countries, all relatively rich when the world as a whole is considered, are home to but 
15% of the world's population (See Table 4). Despite their small share of total population, 38% of 
all contributors to social security systems live in these richest countries. Perhaps, one might say, they 
can afford to make mistakes. Moreover, the slowdown in pensions' expansion in the 1980s may 
warrant a presumption that self correction will play a role in the adjustment of these systems in coming 
years as it apparently did over the past decade. 
The low-income countries, with three-fifths of world population, have less than one-quarter of the 
pension-system contributors and a far smaller share still of pension recipients. They have barely begun 
to offer government-mandated social security programs, having done so in most instances only for 
government employees. China is one very large exception because of the influence of the Soviet 
model. 
For the rest of these countries, there is ample time to develop a sound framework for a strictly-limited 
public program to reduce disability and other social risks. Guarantees of retirement at a specific age 
can still be largely eschewed, and programs could focus on the real purposes of assuring against 
destitution because of termination of work capacity, not because of a wish to choose leisure in an 
environment influenced by a flawed social contract. Only one worker in ten contributes to social 
security today in the low-income countries, and their numbers may be sufficiently small to limit 
political influence that would support unwarranted program expansion. 
Table 4. World population and social security coverage by country income groups, ca. 1990. 
Low Income Economies 
China 
India 
Other Low-Income Economies 
Lower-Middle Income Economies 
Transition Economies 
Market Economies 
Upper-Middle Income Economies 
High-Income Economies 
World Total 
Population 
(millions) 
% 
Distribution 
Contributors 
Labor Force 
% 
% 
Distribution 
of 
Contributors 
Sources: Population: World Developnzent Report 1994, pp. 162-63; contributors as a percentage of total labor 
force, estimated by the authors on the basis of Table A.4 in  World Bank 1994, pp. 356-57. Percentage 
distribution of contributors calculated at mean of contributionAabor force range multiplied by population. 
For China, with nearly one-quarter of its labor force contributing to enterprise-based pension and 
health-care finance systems, reform options are tightly enmeshed with conversion to the socialist market 
economy. Large current subsidies to state enterprises are gradually to be reduced by hardening the 
soft-budget constraints. The enterprises will have to shed many of their current social obligations if 
they are to compete and perform like profit-maximizing firms in neighboring, capitalist countries. 
Oddly, China never has developed irlstitutes for health and social security, leaving management tasks 
to each of the enterprises. A key question is whether the lack of articulated social security institutes, 
which in the Latin America and Caribbean region have become obstacles to reform, will make reform 
in China easier or more difficult. 
The lower-middle-income economies, as identified in the current approach of the World Bank 
Economic and Social Indicators, divide fairly clearly into two classes. Many, such as the Philippines, 
Peru, Morocco, Ecuador, Colombia, Tunisia, Thailand, Turkey, and Iran, have been market economies 
for a long time. The population of countries in this group as a whole was 341 million in 1990. Others 
formed part of the USSR and socialist Eastern Europe, and their population is about 600 million. For 
the long-time market-linked economies, only one-fifth of their labor force are social security 
contributors; but for the command economies, an estimated 80% of the labor force are potential 
claimants on the social security system. With 11% of the world's population, these transitional 
economies are home to nearly one-quarter of pension-system participants. 
As with the transition economies, the upper-middle-income economies, which include South Africa, 
Brazil, Malaysia, Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, and Korea among the largest in this group, there is 
a higher-than-average incidence of participation in public social security programs. These countries, 
unlike the high-income economies, are still too poor to afford bad mistakes. They will have to be 
prudent in considering their options for social security. Many of these countries have elaborate social 
security institutes with large staffs that create substantial administrative costs, often far higher as a 
share of aggregate benefits than are the costs prevailing in high-income economies. The institutes 
themselves may resist reform because of the incumbency of the supply-side beneficiaries of existing 
programs. Social security reform is a priority development issue in virtually all the countries of this 
group. 
CONCLUSION 
We have proposed a model according to which, as living standards rise, the responsibility for insuring 
against risks associated with old age is increasingly laid upon the shoulders of Government. The social 
security system expands as a result. Evidence from OECD countries in the 1980s suggests, however, 
that political support for the expansion of social security spending may eventually weaken and that 
containment then becomes the order of the day. 
This model appears not to describe the development of social security in reforming and transition 
economies, where social security systems have become sources of distortion and imbalance at levels 
of development much lower than those that prevailed in OECD economies when policy makers first 
expressed concern and began to implement measures to correct those imbalances. The reform agenda 
discussed above would shift more risk to the individual, taking reforming and transition economies into 
relatively unexplored territory. The social costs of economic reform and of transition from command 
to market economy have been greater than many analysts anticipated, and how reforms will be 
implemented in the currently difficult atmosphere remains to be seen, as does the long-term viability 
of reformed social security systems. 
This overview may have several key suggestions. For the low-income economies, even including the 
rural majority in China, both efficiency in development, and protection for the poor, may be best 
served by avoiding the appeal of formal social security systems. Existing systems would be a bad 
model to extend to the really poor in rural areas, since these systems redistribute income from the poor 
to the rich. Moreover, informal support mechanisms between and within families would be in danger 
of being crowded out by public programs. Eschewing formal systems may also be appropriate for the 
lower-middle-income market economies for similar reasons. 
Existing pension systems in the transition economies may be the largest development challenge in the 
social sphere. The solution? Get the able elderly (and not-so elderly) off the pension rolls; use the 
savings generated to assist the truly needy throug9 targeted anti-poverty programs. In Ukraine an 
estimated one-quarter of recipients of both age-based and disability pensions are also working for 
wages (World Bank 1993). Over one-quarter of the population are pension recipients. While the 
transition economies must cushion the social costs of enormous economic adjustments, they must do 
so without prejudicing the potential for restoration of economic growth. This requires correction of 
the macro-economic imbalances and micro-economic distortions caused by flawed social security 
systems. 
Some reforming economies support a labor aristocracy with work-related benefits yet do far too little 
to extend equal opportunities to youth in their deprived rural areas. Some of these economies have 
been hobbled by underinvestment in education, lack of saving, and maintenance of privilege among 
an urban minority. Social security institutes have, in some cases, been accomplices in an unfair system 
of benefits for the already better off. Large disparities in economic growth rates are directly linked 
to the patterns of consumption and investment that emerge from differences in allocation of resources. 
Each group of countries faces a range of reform options and must choose those that are appropriate 
to the public's trust in government, willingness to save, ability to avoid problems inherent in both 
public (moral hazard) and private (adverse selection) insurance schemes, and other characteristics that 
make some options more manageable than others. Whatever the choices, social security reform is 
likely to remain at or near the top of any agenda of development challenges for some time to come. 
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